1. ван Бентем Й. Логика и рассуждение: много ли значат факты? // Вопросы философии. 2011. № 12. C. 63-76.
2. Боброва А.С., Драгалина-Черная Е.Г. “Контрпримеры” к modus ponens: логическая корректность и эпистемическая рациональность // Эпистемология и философия науки. 2024. Т. 61. № 4. С. 117-128.
3. Бочаров В.А., Маркин В.И. Введение в логику: учебник. М.: Инфра-М; Форум, 2008.
4. Диксит А.К., Скит С., Рейли Д.Х. Стратегические игры. Доступный учебник по теории игр. М.: Манн, Иванов и Фербер, 2017.
5. Agranov M., Caplin A., Tergiman C. Naive Play and the Process of Choice in Guessing Games // Journal of the Economic Science Association. 2015. Vol. 1. No. 2. P. 146-157.
6. Arslan B., Taatgen N.A., Verbrugge R. Five-Year-Olds’ Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study // Frontiers in Psychology. 2017. Vol. 8. P. 1-16.
7. Aumann R.J. Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games // Contributions to the Theory of Games / Ed. by A. Tucker, D. Luce. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. P. 287-324.
8. Aumann R.J. What Is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? // Frontiers of Economics / Ed. K. Arrow, S. Honkapohja. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985. P. 5-46.
9. Aumann R.J. Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality // Econometrica. 1987. Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 1-18.
10. Baltag A., Smets S. (eds.) Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014.
11. Battigalli P. Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria // Journal of Economic Theory. 1996. Vol. 70. No. 1. P. 201-234.
12. van Benthem J. Logical dynamics meet logical pluralism? // The Australasian Journal of Logic. 2008. Vol. 6. P. 182-209.
13. van Benthem J. Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
14. van Benthem J., Pacuit E., Roy O. Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction // Games. 2011. Vol. 2. No. 1. P. 52-86.
15. Bernheim B.D., DellaVigna S., Laibson D. (eds.) Handbook of Behavioral Economics - Foundations and Applications 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2018.
16. de Bruin B. Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012.
17. Camerer C.F. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiment in Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
18. Cedegao Z., Ham H., Holliday W.H. Does Amy Know Ben Knows You Know Your Cards? A Computational Model of Higher-Order Epistemic Reasoning // Proc. of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. 2021. P. 2588-2594.
19. Colman A.M. Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction // Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2003. Vol. 26. No. 2. P. 139-153.
20. Cook R.T. Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism // Philosophy Compass. 2010. Vol. 5. No. 6. P. 492-504.
21. van Damme E. A Relation between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games // International Journal of Game Theory. 1984. Vol. 13. No. 1. P. 1-13.
22. Declerck R., Reed S. Conditionals: A Comprehensive Empirical Analysis. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2001.
23. Degremont C., Zvespe J. Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam School on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth // Synthese. 2011. Vol. 179. No. 2. P. 223-238.
24. Fudenberg D., Levine D. Limit games and limit equilibria // Journal of Economic Theory. 1986. Vol. 38. No. 2. P. 261-279.
25. Gillies D.B. Solutions to General Zero-Sum Games // Contributions to the Theory of Games / Ed. by A. Tucker, D. Luce. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. P. 47-85.
26. Gintis H. Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory // Analyse & Kritik. 2005. Vol. 27. No. 1. P. 48-72.
27. Ghosh S., Meijering B., Verbrugge R. Strategic Reasoning: Building Cognitive Models from Logical Formulas // Journal of Logic, Language and Information. 2014. Vol. 23. No. 1. P. 1-29.
28. Goeree J.K., Holt C.A., Palfrey T.R. Quantal Response Equilibrium. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
29. Griffiths O., Paseau A.C. One true logic: a monist manifesto. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.
30. Güth W., Schmittberger R., Schwarze B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining // Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 1982. Vol. 3. No. 4. P. 367-388.
31. Haack S. Philosophy of logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
32. Haile P.A., Horta¸csu A., Kosenok G. On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium // American Economic Review. 2008. Vol. 98. No. 1. P. 180-200.
33. Hart S. An interview with Robert Aumann // Macroeconomic Dynamics. 2005. Vol. 9. No. 5. P. 683-740.
34. Johnson-Laird P.N. How We Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
35. Liu F. Diversity of agents and their interaction // Journal of Logic, Language and Information. 2009. Vol. 18. No. 1. P. 23-53.
36. Maschler M., Solan E., Zamir S. Game Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
37. Maskin E., Tirole J. Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions // Journal of Economic Theory. 2001. Vol. 100. No. 2. P. 191-219.
38. McKelvey R.D., Palfrey T.R. Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games // Games and Economic Behavior. 1995. Vol. 10. No. 1. P. 6-38.
39. Myerson R.B. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept // International Journal of Game Theory. 1978. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 73-80.
40. Nagel R. Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study // American Economic Review. 1995. Vol. 85. No. 5. P. 1313-1326.
41. Oaksford M., Chater N. A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection // Psychological Review. 1994. Vol. 101. No. 4. P. 608-631.
42. Ogaki M., Tanaka S.C. Behavioral Economics: Toward a New Economics by Integration with Traditional Economics. Singapore: Springer, 2017.
43. Osborne M.J. Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
44. Pacuit E., Roy O. Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/epistemic-game/ (дата обращения: 12.09.2025).
45. van de Pol I., van Rooij I., Szymanik J. Parameterized Complexity of Theory of Mind Reasoning in Dynamic Epistemic Logic // Journal of Logic, Language and Information. 2018. Vol. 27. No. 3. P. 255-294.
46. Rubinstein A. Interview // Game Theory: 5 Question / Ed. by P. Hendricks, V. Hansen. Copenhagen: Authomatic Press, 2007. P. 157-163.
47. Selten R. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games // International Journal of Game Theory. 1975. Vol. 4. No. 1. P. 25-55.
48. Shoham Y., Leyton-Brown K. Multiagent Systems Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
49. Solaki A., Berto F., Smets S. The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking // Erkenntnis. 2021. Vol. 86. No. 2. P. 733-762.
50. Steinberger F. The Normative Status of Logic // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-normative/ (дата обращения: 01.06.2025).
51. Stenning K., van Lambalgen M. A little logic goes a long way: basing experiment onsemantic theory in the cognitive scienceof conditional reasoning // Cognitive Science. 2004. Vol. 28. No. 4. P. 481-529.
52. Sternberg R.J., Funke J. (eds.) The Psychology of Human Thought. Heidelberg: Heidelberg University, 2019.
53. Szymanik J. Quantifiers and Cognition Logical and Computational Perspectives. Springer, 2016.
54. Velázquez-Quesada F.R. Reasoning Processes as Epistemic Dynamics // Axiomathes. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2015. Vol. 25. No. 1. P. 41-60.
55. Vidal M. The defective conditional in mathematics // Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics. 2014. Vol. 24. No. 1-2. P. 169-179.
56. Wason P.C. Reasoning // New Horizons in Psychology / Ed. by B. Foss. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1966. P. 135-151.
57. Geurts B. Reasoning with quantifiers // Cognition. 2003. Vol. 86. No. 3. P. 223-251.